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NATURAL LAW IN THE
CHURCH TODAY
GEORGE M. REGAN, C.M.*

T

deep ferment in recent Catholic writings on natural
law. Some authors attack the basic validity of the doctrine. Many
critics object to specific aspects of traditional approaches. Finally,
some are striving to rethink and reformulate natural law in line with
contemporary insights.
HERE IS A

For centuries now there have been disputes between the Thomistic
and Suarezian interpretations of natural law. These divergent views
show that even older Catholic authors never agreed on a univocal
understanding of the doctrine. Current controversies, however, reach
deeper than such differences of interpretation to the very heart of the
theory. In addition, they sometimes question certain teachings of the
Church based on natural law. Hence they merit serious consideration.
I shall first summarize and briefly comment upon a few criticisms
raised in current discussions. I shall then survey several significant
efforts at renewal in natural law. Finally, I shall treat some historical
and theological aspects of the Church's teachings on natural law.
Criticism of Natural Law

The contraception controversy has occasioned considerable writing
on natural law. In rejecting the conventional arguments against contraception, some authors have directly criticized or rejected the basic
theory of natural law. Some have branded traditional natural law as
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being reactionary instead of progressive,
biologistic instead of personalistic, essentialistic instead of existentialistic, static
instead of dynamic. Suggested substitutes
include personalistic ethics, an ethics of
process, or an ethics of relationships. The
theme of a developing natural law, based
on a dynamic and changing human nature, runs throughout the current literature.'
Most authors have outlined their revised versions of natural law in articles
or chapters of books. This failure to
elaborate their proposals constitutes a
basic weakness. Many suggestions possess great attraction within the narrow
confines of the contraception debate.
When applied to other moral problems,
they usually lack universal validity. By
way of exception, Germain Grisez proposes in two lengthy studies an elaborated
theory of natural law. 2 His views merit
attention by the specialist in natural law.
In his opinion, the conventional natural law
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theories and the newer trends of "situationism" prove defective as general ethical theories. His own explanations of
natural law and of the immorality of contraception have not, however, received
approval.
Discussion on natural law extends beyond the contraception question and into
the level of Christian ethical principles.
The Protestant difficulty of reconciling
natural law with Christ's preaching of a
morality of love as the New Law occupies
some Catholic scholars. Franz B6ckle
inquires whether the "morality of the
New Covenant tolerates the inclusion of,
or at least the limiting recourse to, a natural moral law." 3 B6ckle's response affirms this possibility. The novelty of his
treatment lies in his asking this fundamental, yet necessary question. Only several years ago, an affirmative reply entered as a supposition into Catholic writings on natural law. B6ckle's comparisons
between Protestant and Catholic views on
natural law provide a valuable contribution in the ongoing ecumenical dialogue.
Most recently, Bishop Francis Simons
of Indore, India, has proposed a totally
revised interpretation of the natural moral
law.4 He intends to establish a form of
natural law which remains true to the
morality of brotherly love preached by
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Christ. "The welfare of mankind" forms
the sole criterion and goal of this fundamental Christian obligation to love. This
perspective might hopefully bring "the
traditional Catholic moral teaching up to
date and in line with the responsible convictions of modem mankind." The Bishop's proposed "consensus ethics" based
on man's common good would reconsider lying, divorce, therapeutic abortion,
and sterilization. His novel presentation,
in my opinion, lacks sufficient substantiation. It nevertheless typifies the revolutionary nature of some gropings for a
more relevant moral theory to replace
traditional natural law.
One might dismiss these criticisms by
questioning the writers' familiarity with
material defending natural law. Such suspicions sometimes do arise when there is
no mention of authors such as Maritain,
Fuchs, Rommen, Murray, Lottin, or Delhaye. To generalize a possible ignorance
as the underlying cause of discontent
would be, I believe, to overlook wellfounded objections of obviously competent critics.
It is my conviction that some current
discontent with natural law traces back
to questionable presuppositions in the
theoretical foundations of the traditional
presentations. In fact, the underlying
theory of natural law has not received
sufficient attention. Many Catholic authors have concentrated on clarifying
specific moral problems by applying commonly accepted natural law teachings as
unquestioned premises. Traditional Catholic moral theology abounds with presumptions about the epistemological basis
of moral perception, the establishment of

objective, inviolable moral values, and the
meaning of human nature itself.' "The
ultimate validity of my premises has been
proven elsewhere" has seemed a rather
prevalent attitude. As a result, many difficulties which most trouble modem critics of traditional natural law have received insufficient treatment in past
Catholic writings on morality.
An excessive reliance by Catholic authors on arguments drawn from authority
has contributed greatly, I believe, to this
situation. The presumably valid conclusions of Catholic moralists and the moral
teachings of the Church apparently rendered superfluous extensive probings into
the theoretical foundations of natural law.
The task of serious inquiry into this
theory fell to specialists in natural law.
Though these specialists actually disagreed
about essential aspects of the doctrine,
this did not occasion uncertainty about
the conclusions based on its premises. In
reality, there exists no single, commonly
accepted exposition of natural law.
This brief resume merely indicates the
general tone of some current attitudes toward natural law. The reborn natural
law proclaimed in relatively recent times
has at least lost much of its vigor.6 Rather than rest on laurels already won, proponents of natural law should heed these

Milhaven, Towards an Epistemology of Ethics,
27 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
228-41
(1966).
McCormick, Contextualism vs. Principles, 27
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 617-20 (1966) summarizes Milhaven's views and comments upon
them.
1 Murray, The Doctrine Lives: The Eternal Return of Natural Law, in WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
295-336 (1960); ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW
135-58 (1947).
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increasingly widespread objections. Admitting the need for a profound rethinking of the doctrine, they should work
toward a more solidly based and convincing presentation.
Contributions toward Renewal
Significant reconsiderations of natural
law have recently appeared, but with less
frequency than criticisms of the doctrine.
I shall present a bibliographical survey of
contributions in two areas: the meaning
of human nature and an ethics grounded
on the human person.
The Meaning of Human Nature
Dissatisfaction with traditional natural
law often stems from its understanding
of human nature as an invariable, determinate, and universal standard of moral
conduct.7 This conception of human nature may lead to a rationalist construction
of an abstract and purely deductive system of conceptualized morality. Some
contemporary critics rebel at this static
view of man and his moral codes. They
see man as an open, dynamic being who
should freely fashion his own incessant
progress, moral perfection, domination of
the material world, and a personalized
existence in community." Josef Fuchs,
Charles Fay, Columba Ryan, and Louis
Monden, among other authors, have attempted to re-establish natural law acDELHAYE,
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cording to this contemporary view of man.
Josef Fuchs defines human nature as
"the essence of man, either according to
his metaphysical Being ('rational animal,'
with all the consequences which necessarily flow from this) or according to his
physical Being, by which from the Creator's will the metaphysical Being is actually real, together with any additional relations." 9 Fuchs' discussion of the historicity of natural law takes a more nuanced
and dynamic view of human nature than
this definition first indicates. He says
that "natural law is more historical than
positive law, even though the latter is
made precisely for historical conditions."
Morality is based on man's Being. However, this Being is either that of man as
such or that of a particular man, including the external and internal circumstances
in which he exists.
Changes in the concrete circumstances
of human nature may lead to changes in
moral obligations. Modern social and
economic conditions found a duty to pay
a family living wage. In different circumstances men might not have this obligation, for it is a conditional duty based on
concrete circumstances. They would always
have the obligation to pay a just wage, for
that is an absolute duty.
In his longer work, Natural Law. A
Theological Investigation, ° Fuchs explains
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9-21 (1960) discusses twenty meanings of the
term "nature."
8 Crowe, Human Nature-Immutable or Mul'able?, 30 IRISH THEOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 204-31
(1963).
Crowe presents the views of Josef
Fuchs and Charles Fay on the mutability of
human nature and analyzes the legitimacy 6f
their interpretations of St. Thomas. His own
understanding seems overly cautious.
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basic themes. However, his overall treatment
presents a more static view of human nature
and natural law.
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more clearly and at greater length his
understanding of human nature. He distinguishes repeatedly between man's metaphysical, absolute, and fixed nature, and
accidentally
existential,
his physical,
changeable nature.
Human nature and its likeness to God are
immutable in their

essentials. .

.

. The

Catholic theologian thinks precisely of
man's absolute and metaphysical nature.
Nature, taken in this sense, is indeed
something fixed yet remains open in many
respects to an accidental determination and
actualization. Insofar as man's nature is
something complete and fixed its meaning
and corresponding moral and juridical
order are naturally laid down permanently.
On the other hand,
even within each stage of salvation-history
there exist continuous and accidental
changes in human nature. .

.

. Human

nature is the primary foundation of all
norms differentiated according to the peculiar character of different circumstances
which, as a result, influence the normative power to this same extent. . . . Man's
nature, being substantially unchangeable,
is accidentally in constant movement. ...
The natural law must be considered as
an internal law comprising the totality of
that moral norm which corresponds to the
totality of man's being.
Fuchs clearly maintains the substantial
invariability of metaphysical human nature. Concrete circumstances nevertheless
play an important part in his doctrine.
The concrete judgment of natural law
relates to "the totality of man's being,"
that is, man's being as it exists here and
now in its concrete reality. Emphasis on
this aspect might allow a more dynamic
understanding of human nature to be
ascribed to Fuchs' total exposition.

Charles Fay, a philosopher-anthropologist, shows that St. Thomas' concept of
human nature and natural law can apply
with analogical flexibility to fit variant
cultural contexts.'1 His general position
is that "human morality has universal and
invariable features and at the same time
is relative to culture." He says that this
paradox results from viewing human nature either abstractly and universally as
univocally common to the entire species,
or concretely and realistically as it actually exists in individual men. In this
latter sense, human nature is subject to
bio-cultural evolution as well as to individuation by determined (signate) matter.
These two conceptions of human nature have great implications for natural
law. By stressing the abstract and universal conception, natural law is judged
to be absolute and immutable. By stressing the concrete and realistic conception,
natural law becomes variable within limits
and subject to evolution. "Today, in a
Thomism brought up to date," he suggests, "the variability of human nature
will occupy a much more prominent position in ethical theory."
Alterations introduced by bio-cultural
evolution are accidental modifications of
human nature, considered in its ontological sense. This does not make these
modifications simply accidental moral determinants. "Accidents make a big difference, as for instance when a man has
sexual relations with someone who is ac-

Human Evolution: A Challenge to
Thomistic Ethics, 2 INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 50-80 (1962).
11 Fay,
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cidentally not his wife." Some changes
so alter the meaning of human knowledge
and power (the agricultural and industrial
revolutions), or so transform the relations between men (the urban revolution)
and between men and nature (atomic
energy, polymer chemistry) that
certain acts which were formerly good
become bad, and vice versa. I do not
deny that the species of morally significant acts are determined in the light of
universal human needs which are stable:
lying, stealing, and murder are bad of
their very nature, precisely because they
frustrate universal human appetites. But
I do deny that the species of moral acts
is determined exclusively in the light of
such needs: the species of good and bad
acts are also determined by a constellation of biological and cultural conditions
and emergent needs which are both variable and relative.
Fay sees implications for natural law
in the evolutionary vision of Teilhard de
Chardin.
Man is now on the verge of exercising
human dominion over the bio-cultural
modifications of human existence. It belongs to man that he complete, in the
light of the finalities or evolutionary tendencies of his nature, his imperfect biocultural structures, his largely potential
principles of action. .

.

. The evolutionary

world entails a moral transformation since
it bears on man's distinctive nature in
relation to God. .

.

. We are witnessing

at present, in our own time, a formally
new degree of participation in the eternal
law inasmuch as humans are now exercising human providence not merely in the
alteration of human institutions for the
improved satisfaction of human needs but
even with regard to an artificial selection
of genes which will create in our descendants a greater capacity for immanent action and a still more adequate image of
God.
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Fay's conclusion provides valuable material for further reflection.
Human nature considered universally and
abstractly may be regarded as an immutable standard enduring throughout the
variable relations of man to his environment, to his fellow man, to himself, and
to God. If, however, we consider human
nature as it actually exists in place and
time, we discover that human potentialities and inclinations rooted in it vary
within limits, and these variations are
ethically significant. Furthermore, progress
is made with regard to the existence of
the natural moral law in man inasmuch
as human knowledge and power, considered as a created participation of the
eternal law, tend to expand in time with
the result that man enjoys a greater fullness of life, a higher level of immanence
on successive evolutionary levels..
Even on one cultural plateau . . . variable

adjustments are made in view of unique
historical, ecological, and social factors.
Hence the value orientation of a people
is necessarily relative to their culture.
Nevertheless, "the evolutionary vision of
human moral life reveals universal and
necessary features which underlie the humanly created value systems and which
constitute a continuing framework for
further moral progress."
Columba Ryan wants to update the
traditional concept of natural law in line
with modern thought.' 2 He insists that
"to be human" must be understood in
the total human context. Man is not simply a complex of organs. Human beings
define themselves in relation to the world
and to those around them. Man must not

12 Ryan, The Traditional Concept of Natural
Law: An Interpretation, in LIGHT ON THE NATURAL LAW

13-37 (Evans ed. 1965).
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be considered simply as a biological object. Sufficient account must be taken of
the specifically human dimension in which
he enters into communication with others
at a human level. That is "natural" to
man which constitutes him not merely in
isolation, but in relation to the whole
world-for-man which he creates around
him, that is, the highly artificial world of
civilization, and in relation to other persons who stand not simply as objects but
as subjects around him.
It follows that
human fulfillment is to be judged not
simply in biological terms, but in terms
of the full realization of a man's personality in relation with other persons against
the background of this network of communications. That will be right for him
which enables him to fulfill himself in
this dimension, and that wrong which
does not. There is a sense in which the
existentialist affirmation that man creates
his essence by the decisions he takes rather than comes into the world with a
ready-made essence represents a profound
insight. To be forever progressing is a
characteristic of man; the world around
him is his world, the world-for-him, the
world of his own ceaseless making and
realization.
This relational and developing concept of
human nature implies that, as new situations arise, new conclusions must be
drawn from the general principles of natural law. Some earlier conclusions may
have no further application, or only a
modified application.
While admitting the validity of a metaphysical conception of human nature,
therefore, Ryan emphasizes, as does Fay,
the existential or concrete conception of
human nature. Human nature as it actually exists in time and space, including

all the relational aspects of the individual,
forms the basis of natural law.
Louis Monden presents a valuable
analysis of situation ethics."3 He first
presents views of Henri Bergson, A. Hesnard, and existentialist ethics on an ethics
of law as opposed to an ethics of creative
freedom. He also outlines some key elements of evolutionary morality and of
trends toward situation ethics within
Catholicism. In concluding this introductory section Monden cites the note of
the Holy Office in 1956 which summarized and disapproved of certain assertions of situation ethics. He then states:
According to the same authors, the traditional notion of 'natural law' no longer
satisfies; one must appeal to the notion of
'existing nature,' which generally represents no absolute and objective value, but
only a relative, hence a changeable value,
with the possible exception of a few data
and principles referring to 'metaphysical'
(that is, absolute and unchangeable) human nature. The traditional notion of
,natural law' stands on the level of this
merely relative value.
Monden outlines some elements of a
solution to this problem of legal ethics
versus situation ethics. What is the authentic meaning of law on the moral level of
man's existence? Mere creative arbitrariness cannot be identified with freedom in
a philosophy inspired by Christianity.
This philosophy conceives man's deepest
nature as a relation to God; the fact of
being a creature, of existing by and in
relation to Another, must affect man's
whole unfolding self-realization. Although
human freedom does indeed really create
value out of itself, it is never only a free13 MONDEN,
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dom 'towards' an intended fullness of
possible self-realization. That fullness is
not prefigured as an abstract scheme, a
blueprint to be reproduced, but as a dynamically inviting possibility, a concrete
project to be carried out in the midst of
the concrete situation in which man's
'self' presents its demands to an 'ego'
consciously realizing itself. 'Become what
thou art' is, on the moral level, the fundamental law by which the authenticity or
unauthenticity of a human development,
and of the separate actions in which that
development takes shape, can be measured.
He now enters into the heart of his
treatment of natural law and human
nature.
That inner law of growth has traditionally
borne the name 'natural law.' Hence in
its classical meaning the term 'natural
law' has no connection with the physical
or biological concept of 'nature,' formerly
in frequent use in the positive sciences
and in ethics, with which it is often
wrongly identified even nowadays (for
instance, in the treatment of sexual problems). Thus some actions are supposed
to be 'according to' or 'against' nature.
But an action which is biologically 'according to' nature may very well be
morally in conflict with the 'natural law.'
Hence the fact that the notion of 'nature'
is outmoded in the positive sciences cannot be used as an argument against the
natural law in the moral sense, since it
has no connection whatsoever with it. ....
Historically . . . the natural law . . . appealed to an unwritten law, an inborn
knowledge of what man ought to do and
ought not to do in order to be and to
become authentically himself. . . . In its
original meaning the natural law is a
dynamic existing reality, an ordering of
man towards his self-perfection and his
self-realization, through all the concrete
situations of his life and in intersubjective
dialog with his fellow man and with God.
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• . . It is precisely man's becoming which
is prefigured in it. The norm of man's
action is not so much what he is as what
he is to become.
Monden denies that this dynamic conception of natural law based on "a dynamically inviting possibility, a concrete
project to be carried out in the midst of
the concrete situation" implies "a variability in that law in the sense that it
might be arbitrarily modified under the
influence of individual or collective feeling." Though regressions and modifications may temporarily occur, the Teilhardian vision of an increasing interiorization
of consciousness eventually assures that
the general law of development will be
in accord with the awareness of what developing man ought to become. This
growing moral awareness of authentic
human possibilities will inevitably lead to
man's evolving and developing in the direction of greater reverence for human
life and authentic human love.
These words show clearly that Monden
seeks a reconciliation of modem trends
and contemporary criticisms of natural
law through a basic reformulation of the
concept of human nature. His key working premise is that human nature is open,
evolving, developing as "a dynamically
inviting possibility." That view of man
which Fuchs calls "man's physical nature" becomes Monden's sole stress in
presenting natural law in terms relevant
to contemporary thought. While holding
out for objective morality, he uses contemporary insights into man's existential
reality.. His retention of objective moral
norms distinguishes his opinion from modern trends of situation ethics based exclusively on "existing nature." He does

NATURAL LAW

not sufficiently clarify, I believe, the manner whereby "the Teilhardian vision of
an increasing interiorization of consciousness" assures the authenticity of man's
moral development. His treatment does,
however, offer valuable insights and reflections for those who want to reformulate natural law.
This survey indicates the diverse meanings attached to the term "human nature"
by some recent authors. Fuchs and Fay
distinguish explicitly between abstract and
concrete human nature. The former refers to man's metaphysical being and is
consequently realized in an univocal, universal, and essentially immutable way in
all men. Concrete or real human nature
refers to man's physical being as realized
existentially in different historical eras
and in specific situations. In this latter
usage, all man's being at a given moment
becomes morally relevant. Thus his metaphysical qualities, such as his creatureliness, body-soul unity, and relatedness to
society, retain vital importance as moral
determinants. In addition, man's concrete
and individual qualities, such as temperament, bio-cultural development, intellectual acumen, working profession, and intersubjective relations, enter as factors
for moral judgment. They offer sources
of "dynamic inviting possibilities," inclinations, and tendencies for moral selfrealization.
I agree wth Fay that the concrete conception of human nature, whereby its
variability is stressed, should occupy a
more prominent place in natural law
theory. Man's total being in his concrete
situation, his "existing nature," correctly
understood, should enter more into our

expositions of morality. This would retain the relevance of universal norms
based on metaphysical human nature. At
the same time, it would provide a more
acceptable explanation of the role of cultural and historical determinants. Fuchs
presents the l asis for such developments.
Fay, Ryan, and Monden explain this
viewpoint more explicitly. By continuing
to emphasize this more concrete understanding of man, proponents of natural
law may carry greater weight in the con14
temporary world.
Personalist Trends
The modern trend to emphasize the
unique, ineffable, and incommunicable
worth of the individual human person has.
many implications for natural law theory.
Some authors prefer to ground their ethics in direct relation to the concrete human person in his interpersonal relationships. The individual person is not
classed merely as one realization of "human nature" as accidentally and contingently modified. 15 Instead, the person's
14See also
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singular dignity becomes the point of departure for ethical inquiry.

task of responding to actions of others in
terms of our understanding of them.

J. Lotz sees this ontology of existence
ruled over by the concept of person as
confronting the Western tradition of an
ontology of being under the dominance
of material reality. 16 Instead of departing
from the general concept of being and
then working down to the individual person as a class of beings, he attempts to
begin with the person. A system of
values will be set up only and precisely
through the communication of existence
to person. In this perspective, even the
positively individual factors of the person's existence belong to concrete moral
judgments, not as a mere "case" or application of a general law nor even as a
merely typical instance, but as an individual mediation of God's call demanding
response.

What is the ultimate horizon of man's
responsibility? Being itself. This constitutes for man the supreme value which he
is called to promote in all his interactions
through the use of his discerning intelligence. By being responsive to the demands of this value in all he does and
encounters, man achieves his integrity as
a personal subject. The dynamic relation
of the human self to Absolute Being is
thus the foundation of man's moral life.
In Johann's views, morality is a matter
of invention and creativity. It looks forward to the enhancement of patterns already achieved and not merely backwards
to their retention. The ultimate norm in
the moral realm and its only absolute law
is, therefore, the law of intelligent responsiveness: to be for Being by seeking it
always in all situations.

In the United States, Robert Johann
has stressed a more personalized view of
man and its ethical implications. 1 In his
approach, man's ethical task is one of
creative responsibility, whereby he fulfills
his role as a being free of the determinisms of physical nature and as one for
whom environment exists on his own terms.
Man's objective awareness puts him in the
presence of other persons as others, making his life fundamentally a matter of encounter and interaction. Life becomes a

16See

BOCKLE,

op. cit. supra note 3, at 107-

09.
17Johann, Love and Justice, in ETHICS AND
SOCIETY 25-47 (1966); Responsible Parenthood:
A Philosophical View, 20 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CATHOLIC
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THEOLOGICAL

(1965);

THE

SOCIETY

MEANING

OF

AMERICA

OF

LovE

This promotive response to Being must
necessarily be embodied in our relationships to the things and persons who surround us. Hence, traditionally articulated
values and disvalues can serve us as objectively valid guidelines in the making of
our moral decisions. Such codes of behavior embody the cumulative growth of
moral insight into the consonance of certain types of deportment with man's
fundamental dynamism as Being's agent
and the dissonance of certain other types.
Such codes are not, however, finally decisive in our moral choices. We must
rather look to the election of that course
of action which in the light of all its foreseeable consequences is most consistent
with our vocation to promote Being.
Johann believes that what alone is moral-
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ly decisive is the total sense of an action
as seen in the concrete situation to which
it is a response and as judged in the light
of man's fundamental vocation as a person.
I have sketched in broad outline some
recent positions concerning the basis of
natural law. Most authors seem more
than aware of the insights of existentialism, evolution, and modem thought in
general into the dynamic, historical, and
changing being of man. Some prefer to
discuss the basis of natural law within a
more traditional framework and terminology. They stress the immutability of human nature, taken in its metaphysical
sense. At the same time, they admit concrete historical modifications of a contingent and accidental sort in existing human
nature. Others put almost their entire
emphasis on this latter aspect of human
nature, calling it the only ethically relevant aspect for concrete moral decisions.
Finally, some authors are trying to found
ethical judgments on the more concrete
basis of the human person himself in his
interpersonal relationships. This rather
broad trend toward a "personalism" may
simply restate in individualized or concrete form the traditional approach to
natural law. On the other hand, authors
such as Johann use the human person
himself as the starting point for ethical
considerations. We are clearly in the
midst of a development toward a personalist and existentialist ethics which has
yet to be worked out in all its dimensions."'
is For further reading, see Walgrave, Is Morality
Static or Dynamic?, in Moral Problems and
Christian Personalism, 5 CONCILiuM
22-38

The Church and Natural Law"9
Disagreements

among

contemporary

Catholic authors about natural law do not
prove that the Church herself finds difficulty with the traditional doctrine. One
possible reaction to the present controversies, therefore, might involve casting
suspicion on the orthodoxy of innovators
who deny, doubt, or criticize the usual
explanations of natural law.
Allusions to authoritative Church statements may occasion a certain hesitancy
in Catholics who favor sweeping revisions
or at least a reassessment of natural law.
How far can a Catholic go in tampering
with natural law theory? Does the Church
propose an officially accepted doctrine of
natural law? Accurate discussion of these
questions requires important nuances.
Approaches which disregard the historical
background or the theological interpretation of the Church's pronouncements on
natural law risk essential distortions.
These necessary tools of theology allow
one to reach the reality of the Church's
position on natural law.
A striking contrast confronts one who
studies the Church's statements on natural law. In comparison with recent
times, the Church spoke rather infrequently about natural law in past ages. Before
the mid-nineteenth century, in fact, references to natural law occur only rarely in
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ecclesiastical documents.
The Synod of Arles (473 A.D.) makes
the earliest authoritative statement about
natural law, but only in a general way
and when discussing grace and predestination during the times preceding Christ's
coming. Much later, in the fifteenth and
seventeenth centuries, several papal documents allude to natural law as the standard for condemning specific vices, such as
fornication, masturbation, and the extramarital use of sex. These statements
simply mention the term "natural law" in
passing, without clarifying its meaning.
Though the Scholastics, notably St.
Thomas Aquinas, had written a great deal
about natural law, one cannot read any
such systematic interpretations of natural
law into any of these early official texts.
Since about 1850, official Church statements rely increasingly upon natural law
perspectives. Pope Pius IX initiated this
modern tendency by referring to natural
law in connection with a variety of disparate topics, such as communism, onanistic intercourse within marriage, clerical
immunity from military service, the origins of the binding force of civil laws, the
indissolubility of marriage, and the possibility of salvation for an unbeliever in
good faith. His many references to natural law did not, however, construct an
official philosophical or theological system
of natural law. Following the practice of
earlier papal statements, his pronouncements merely mention the reality of natural law as the moral basis for condemning specific errors and vices.
From the pontificate of Pope Leo XIII
onward, the popes, with the exception of
Pope St. Pius X and Pope Benedict XV,
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have continued this dependence on natural law begun by Pope Pius IX. Various papal statements have repeatedly expressed the Church's competence to teach
authoritatively the natural law, both in
principles and in concrete applications.
Appealing to natural law, the popes have
made pronouncements on the moral aspects of political structures, the social
order, race relations, the conduct of war,
conjugal morality and the extra-marital
use of sex, medico-moral problems, and
the education of youth.
References to natural law enter so frequently into the official documents of Pope
Pius XII that a recent doctoral thesis was
devoted entirely to an analysis of natural
law in the teachings of this pope. 20 More
than any other pope in history, his many
statements about natural law cover almost
every aspect of the doctrine and reflect
an underlying systematic
significantly
theory of natural law.
Pope John XXIII also spoke of natural
law in his two major social encyclicals,
Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris.
While emphasizing to a remarkable degree
the historicity and temporality of man,
Vatican II did not terminate this modem
phenomenon of the Church's reliance on
natural law argumentation. The two conciliar documents which discuss the relationships between the Church and the
secular order, the Declaration on Religious Freedom and the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
refer fairly frequently to natural law perspectives. Without doubt, therefore, the

20 FAV"RA, op. cit. supra note 19.
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doctrine of natural law has assumed in
modem times a role of prime importance
in official Church documents.
What explains this growing reliance
upon natural law which so contrasts with
earlier practice of the Church? Josef
Fuchs cites several plausible reasons: the
early Church generally exhibited less concem in moral problems than does the
modem Church; contemporary secularized
culture opens itself only to Church teachings drawn from reason, rather than from
ecclesiastical authority or divine revelation; and finally, the teachings of positivism, which became so widespread in modern times, have required refutations based
on reason. 21 In addition, I would say,
the Church's involvement in the so-called
"social question" has demanded a greater
dependence on natural law. From sheer
necessity, one might think, papal statements on wages, unions, private property,
just taxation, and similar issues present
argumentation founded for the most part
on the dignity and rights of man discoverable by human reason.
Despite this abundant material which
mentions natural law, no single ecclesiastical document contains a thorough systematic development of the doctrine. This
does not deny that many pronouncements
of recent popes speak precisely of various
theoretical aspects of natural law. For
example, Pope Pius XII's extensive statements treat nearly every facet of natural
law. He spoke on such specific details as
the relationship between the divine order
in the world and natural law, the philosophical and theological meaning of hu-

21

FUCHS, op. cit. supra note

10, at 3-4.

man nature, and the qualities of objectivity, immutability, and universality of
natural law.
What proves rather interesting, on the
other band, is the official silence about
major difficulties raised today against natural law. A person who believes that
the Church teaches officially a fully elaborated system of natural law must face
the perhaps surprising fact that there
exist no developed treatments by the
Church's teaching office of the Humean
problem of the passage from "Is" to
"Ought" in moral theory or of the relevancy of cultural and historical determinants. In effect, the Church's official
documents bypass some controverted
issues in the establishment of natural law,
leaving this material to the free inquiry
and discussion of philosophers and theologians. The Church thus presents many
specific moral conclusions based on natural law, but she has not fully elaborated
an official system.
Though gaps exist in the Church's
teachings on natural law, this has not
prevented some authors from using the
actual teachings of the Church. Works
on medical ethics and social morality, for
example, frequently cite pertinent papal
statements on specific issues.2 2 Such summaries do not, however, present a systematic theory of natural law. On the
other hand, some authors have analyzed
23
basic elements in the Church's teachings.
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These major proposals, gleaned from a
variety of papal documents, prove particularly important for these authors because of their exceptional doctrinal value.
They may be briefly stated as follows:.
(1) Together with the revelation communicated in Christ's person,
words, and deeds, natural law constitutes one of the two major
sources of the moral teaching of
the Church. A frequent distinction
drawn between natural law and
divine positive law contrasts natural law with that found in divine
revelation. In a broader sense,
both natural law and the teaching
of revelation are sometimes called
divine law.
(2) The Church's documents view natural law as deriving from God as
Creator and divine positive laws
contained in revelation as deriving
from Him as Redeemer. The Creator-natural law dimension is at
times differentiated from the Re-.
deemer-revelation dimension, in
much the same way as nature is
differentiated from the supernatural.
(3) As the guardian of the Christian
moral order to which all men are
called in Christ, the Church is
likewise the guardian of the natural moral order. This latter
forms an integrating element of
the uniquely existing supernatural
order and does not exist apart
from it. Consequently, in accordance with its divinely appointed
mission, the Church clarifies the
prescriptions of natural law and
defends its exigencies.
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(4) The nature of man, as God's own
work, is the ontological basis of
natural law, which forms the rational standard for moral activity
and expresses the moral order
willed by God. Natural law thus
refers to an objective order of
morality based on man's nature.
Various social institutions, such
as the family and the state, find
their foundation in natural law.
(5) The ontological basis of natural
law establishes its absolute value.
This precludes relativism in morals,
for this absoluteness applies to
more than a few general norms of
natural law. Natural law serves
as the criterion of all human laws,
for no just law can contradict
man's being. In addition, the ontological foundation of natural law
implies that it remains substantially
intact and unchangeable throughout all times and in all places.
(6) The Church never understands
natural law as a naturalistic
or merely rationalistic creation
of an autonomous man. The
being on which reason reflects
and the reasoning power itself
flow from God's creative work in
man.
Both participate in the
divine Being and in the divine
Intelligence.
(7) Many pronouncements use the
Pauline theme found in Romans
2. The popes say that natural
law is found within man, "written in his heart." Man has the
power to discover this law of his
being, at least if he is not blinded
by sin or passion. In this sense,
reason itself is sometimes termed

NATURAL LAW

natural law, for reason discovers
the concrete good and evil in proposed human activity. In short,
the objective basis of the moral
order, which is man's being, has
its subjective complement in man's
rational ability to discover this objective order in the ontological
structure of his being.
When examined more closely this body
of papal teaching provides mostly a skeletal doctrine of natural law. It does not
resemble St. Thomas' systematic exposition. No mention occurs of the manner of deriving the precepts of natural
law or of their specific content. These
propositions state little more than the
continuing, valid existence within the
Christian moral order of a divinely ordained, universal, substantially immutable, and objective moral order, based on
man's nature and discernible by man's
reason. On the other hand, when considered against the background of relativism and subjectivism so evident in
modern ethical thought, this core content
of the Church's teachings on natural law
theory makes a substantial contribution.
The doctrinal value assigned to these
teachings assumes some importance. Some
theologians imply that it constitutes a
"matter of faith." In their opinion, the
Church infallibly proposes this core content of natural law theory in contradistinction to many other, less doctrinally
important statements about natural law.
How do theologians reach this conclusion?
Why do they not attribute equal doctrinal
value to all the Church's statements on
natural law? To answer these questions
is to clarify further the reality of an official position of the Church on natural

law theory.
A tendency exists among many Catholics to ascribe equal weight to nearly
all teachings of the Church. This tendency stems from the laudable esteem attributed to the pope, the bishops, and
other ecclesiastical authorities by Catholics.
While acknowledging the good
aspects of this attitude, one should not
overlook its basic naivete and sometimes
erroneous foundation. Even a superficial
acquaintance with the history of theology
would establish the reality of development,
progress, and differences of opinion in
the teachings of popes, bishops, and even
24
councils.
Another tendency toward oversimplification has recently been termed "creeping infallibility." 25 Some theologians have
inclined toward maximizing papal infallibility by attributing this quality to more
pronouncements than seems justifiable by
the restricted terms of Vatican I's definition of papal infallibility. Even passing
remarks of the Holy Father are sometimes
viewed on a par with more solemn statements.
The frequency and qualitative differences of papal statements should lead
Catholics to a certain sophistication in
evaluating their authoritative character.
Pope Pius XII made over a thousand
statements during his pontificate, the majority of which treated matters dealing

24
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with faith and morals. He delivered these
statements in encyclicals, allocutions,
radio messages, and audiences of scientists, nurses and parishioners of country
districts. The range and variety of the
pope's statements indicates the basic weakness in any univocal conception of their
doctrinal value.

26

According to Catholic doctrine, infallible
pronouncements of the Church preclude
the possibility of doctrinal error. Vatican
II states succinctly the narrow extent of
this infallible authority:
The Roman Pontiff, as the head of the
college of bishops enjoys (infallibility) in
virtue of his office, when, as the supreme
shepherd and teacher of all the faithful
• . . he proclaims by a definitive act some
doctrine of faith or morals.
The infallibility promised to the Church
resides also in the body of bishops when
that body exercises supreme teaching authority with the successor of Peter. ...
This is so, even when they are dispersed
around the world, provided that while
maintaining the bond of unity among
themselves and with Peter's successor,
and while teaching authentically on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a
single viewpoint as the one which must
be held conclusively. This authority is
even more clearly verified when, gathered
together in an ecumenical council, they
are teachers and judges of faith and mor27
als for the universal Church.
Has the body of bishops or the pope
issued any statement on natural law which
of itself constitutes an infallible pronouncement? Gregory Baum would simply deny
the possibility of the Church's defining
26
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In his opinion, only the data of

revelation and what is absolutely necessary to explain or defend revelation in a
given situation falls under the Church's
prerogative of infallibility. One need not,
however, hold this minority view in order
to give a negative response to the question
as posed. Examination of the teachings
of the Church presents no certain example
of a statement on the existence, essence,
or application of natural law which of
itself constitutes an infallible definition.
As will be seen, this initial conclusion does
not exclude the possibility that the constant reliance of the Church's teaching
office on natural law perspectives implies that its existence and basic value are
articles of faith.
One main area of investigation for an
infallible statement on natural law is
Vatican I's definition that man can know
God by his natural reason .2

Two widely

respected moral theologians, John Ford
and Gerald Kelly, comment in this connection:
"The Vatican Council taught
that, although supernatural revelation
is not an absolute requisite for knowing
the natural truths of religion, yet it is
a moral, or practical, necessity for knowing such truths with ease, with certitude,
and without any admixture of error. The
Vatican Council did not expressly mention the natural law as a part of the

28 Baum,

supra note 25; Baum, The Christian

Adventure-Risk and Renewal, 23 CRITIc 41-53
(1965).
29 "The same Holy Mother Church holds and
teaches that God, the beginning and end of
all things, can be known with certitude by the
natural light of human reason from created
things." Denzinger, 1785.
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truths of natural religion." 30
This last sentence rightly implies that
Vatican I did not directly define anything about the natural law as such. Two
later papal encyclicals, Pope Pius XI's
Casti connubii (1930) and Pope Pius
XII's Humani generis (1950), furnished
official commentaries on this definition of
Vatican I, "extending to the natural moral
law what the Council has affirmed about
knowledge of God." 3 This extended interpretation does not, however, share in
the infallible character of the original
conciliar definition.
Besides Vatican I, no other council
has taught anything about natural law as
the direct object of an infallible definition.
Vatican II, as I mentioned previously,
employs natural law perspectives fairly
frequently. These conciliar statements presume the existence of a natural moral
order and specify moral teachings consonant with this order. The Council does
not elaborate beyond this minimum presumption any general theory of natural
law. From the expressed intention of the
Council, moreover, none of its statements, except those which refer to prior
infallible statements of the Church, are
proposed infallibly.
The recent popes consider many specific
moral problems on the basis of natural
law.
Many examples could be cited
where the existence of the natural law is
simply presumed.
In fact, the popes
follow this as their usual procedure. Despite these presumptions about the existence and the essence of the natural law,

no single statement is infallibly proposed.
Only Pope Pius XI's encyclical Casti
connubii contains material which some
theologians have thought to be infallibly
taught. The controverted material in this
encyclical, however, treats contraception
and not the existence or essence of natural
law. 32
Theological inquiry should not end
here. Vatican I's solemn definition of
papal infallibility proclaimed that the pope
enjoys the prerogative of infallibility when,
acting as head of the college of bishops
and as the supreme shepherd and teacher
of all the faithful, he proclaims by a
definitive act some doctrine of faith or
morals, that is, when he speaks ex ca3
thedra."
Since this definition in 1870,
many theologians have tended to extend
its rather narrow limits to include the
canonization of saints, the approval of
religious orders, and the doctrinal sub-

3' "Since, therefore, openly departing from the

uninterrupted Christian tradition some recently
have judged it possible solemnly to declare an-

other doctrine regarding this question, the
Catholic Church, to whom God has entrusted
the defence of the integrity and purity of morals, standing erect in the midst of the moral
ruin which surrounds her, in order that she
may preserve the chastity of the nuptial union
from being defiled by this foul stain, raises her
voice in token of her divine ambassadorship
and through Our mouth proclaims anew: any
use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such
a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in
its natural power to generate life is an offence
against the law of God and of nature, and
those who indulge in such are branded with
the guilt of a grave sin." (N.C.W.C. translation). See Dewart, Casti Connubii and the
Development of

30 FORD-KELLY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 4-5.
31 AUBERT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 93.
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stance of canon law. Furthermore, many
manuals in dogmatic theology and theological articles have proposed that, besides
ex cathedra definitions, "the ordinary
teaching authority of the Church" is also
infallible. This term applies especially to
the regular teachings of the popes through
encyclicals, allocutions, and decrees. Theologians who attribute infallibility to this
ordinary teaching of the pope obviously
go beyond the explicit terms of Vatican
I's definition.
Some recent writers have attacked the
34
extended concept of papal infallibility.
They contend that Vatican I defined a
rather limited understanding of infallibility. No Catholic needs to believe more
or less than the narrow terms of the
conciliar definition. In their opinion, the
extended concept of papal infallibility is
another instance of "creeping infallibility."
Since this position seems perfectly orthodox, a Catholic may hold freely either
the restricted concept of papal infallibility
as defined expressly by Vatican I or the
extended concept as proposed by some
theologians.
By applying the restricted notion of
papal infallibility to the popes' statements
about natural law, a person might conceivably conclude that a Catholic has no
obligation to believe as matters of faith
any papal statements on natural law. No
individual conciliar or papal pronouncement has taught the doctrine infallibly,
and even a concatenation of papal statements would not be infallible. Some
theologians have applied this reasoning to
the Church's teachings on contraception,
concluding that the immorality of this
34
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practice has not been taught infallibly. To
my knowledge, however, no Catholic
theologian would deny the existence and
basic value of natural law on exactly
these grounds.
Acceptance of the extended concept of
papal infallibility leads to important consequences. Some authors assert that the
popes have spoken so frequently and
clearly about the existence, essence, and
application of natural law that the doctrine has been taught as a matter of faith.
Jean-Marie Aubert writes: "The recent
popes . . . have treated of natural law
(or of natural right) with such abundance and precision that one cannot doubt
that this is a truth of faith." a3In his book
Natural Law: A Theological Investigation,36 Josef Fuchs speaks in a similar
vein: "These testimonies to natural law
and valid natural rights which are given
by the teaching authorities of the Church
put it beyond all doubt that this is a
Neither
question of a truth of faith."
author develops this point made in passing. From their contexts, however, both
statements could be taken as proceeding
from the extended concept of papal infallibility, whereby the ordinary teaching
authority of the Church possesses the
prerogative.
Fuchs seems to qualify his view to
some extent in another work, Theologia
inoralis generalis,37 when he states: "One
can easily concede that, because of its
proposal by the Church, the doctrine of
natural law, at least in its substance, pertains to faith; especially if we consider

35 AUBERT, op. cit. supra note 10, at 38.

a0 FUCHS, op. cit. supra note 10, at 6.
37 FUCHS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 70.
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at the same time the tradition of theologians developing under the vigilance
of the magisterium and the teaching of
sacred scripture." Fuchs here views the
papal teaching office in conjunction with
traditional theological writings and with
the words of divine revelation, and not in
isolation.
Various reasons lead me to favor this
latter explanation of Fuchs, who maintains that the existence and substantial
value of natural law are articles of faith.
The frequency of the popes' recourse to
natural law in modern times would be a
major factor in leading to this position.
In addition, as Fuchs has stated, the longstanding teaching of this doctrine by
theologians bears witness to its authenticity within Christian tradition. Finally, the
majority of Catholic scriptural exegetes
hold that Sacred Scripture teaches the
existence and basic value of natural law
as a perduring reality within the Christian
order. 3s
Not every position on natural law taken
by the Church's teaching office is likewise a matter of faith. Quite the contrary is true. Only the core content of
the Church's teaching, which is a witness
to and expression of the belief of the college of bishops and of the Christian faith-

ful, constitutes infallible doctrine. This
core content includes the existence of an
objective moral order ordained by God
and man's capacity to discern the substantial elements of this moral order. The
core content does not include the refinements and disputed aspects of natural
law theory to be found in the Thomistic
or Suarezian interpretations.
One might draw a parallel between the
doctrinal value assigned to the Church's
teachings on natural law and her teachIn the
ings prohibiting contraception.
former case, the Church has asserted positively the existence, essence, and practical application of this moral standard.
In the case of contraception, the Church
has formulated mostly negative prohibitions concerning a specific practice. Both
these doctrines have a long history within Christian theology. Neither of them
has formed, I believe, the direct object of
a specific infallible pronouncement. Some
Catholic writers limit the core content of
the infallibly proposed doctrine on contraception to the basic values which must
be respected within marriage. " Others say
that the Church's doctrine asserts basic-
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AND CANONISTs 532-33 (1965) sums up this
approach as follows: "At the core of the
existing commitment might be found other
values than the absolute, sacral value of coitus.
Through a variety of formulas, five propositions had been asserted by the Church. ProProcreation of offspring
creation is good.
reaches its completion only in their education.
Innocent life is sacred. The personal dignity
of a spouse is to be respected. Marital love
is holy."

13
ally that the essence of marriage is incompatible with the basic decision to exclude positively all children from marriage. 40
Similarly, in my opinion, the
core content of the infallible teachings
about natural law theory concerns only
the existence of an objective moral order
willed by God and discernible by man's
reason.
Besides this kernel of infallible teachings, all other statements of the Church
on the theory of natural law come under
the category of authentic teaching. Pope
Pius XII applied to this kind of teaching
Christ's words:
"He who hears you,
hears me." 14
Vatican II states that
Catholics are to show a "religious submission of mind and will . . . to the
authentic teaching authority of the Roman
Pontiff," and a "religious assent of soul"
to the teachings of bishops concerning
faith and morals. The conciliar texts
specify further that religious submission
to the authentic teaching of the Pope includes reverent acknowledgement of his
supreme teaching office and sincere adhesion to his judgments, according to his
mind and will. The context of these
conciliar statements indicates clearly that
this authentic teaching is an exercise of
the preaching of the gospel carried out by
teachers endowed with Christ's authority,
in order to clarify matter pertaining to
42
faith by the light of the Holy Spirit.
Most teachings of the Church on natural
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law fit under this classification of authentic teaching. It becomes relevant, therefore, to ascertain the meaning of the "religious submission of mind and will" required in response to this teaching. John
J. Reed has competently investigated this
question at some length and I shall summarize his conclusions.4 3 I shall then
make some additional comments.
From a teaching of this sort, two consequences follow, one external and absolute, the other internal and conditional.
In the external order, there results the
obligation not to contradict the doctrine
in public speech or writing. One would
certainly not be entitled either singly or
in company with other private theologians
to enter into open conflict with the magisterium established by Christ. All this
would not exclude speculative discussion
on the part of theologians, supposing a
discrete audience and method of discourse,
with a view to clarifying the issues and
finding the answers to difficulties involved. The question is not, however,
to be approached as something on which
either side is of equal standing or could
be equally followed. In the internal order,
there results ordinarily the obligation of
intellectual assent to and acceptance of the
authentic
teaching.
Certain
nuances
must be introduced here. In the supposition, the teaching is not infallible and
the opposite remains possibly true. The
absolute possibility thus remains that an
exceptionally qualified person may have
grave reason to think that the proposition
is not certainly true. In this hypothesis,
the individual would remain bound by the
teachings in the external order. He would

THE CHURCH,
43 Reed, supra note 19.
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not, however, be obliged to yield internal
assent. Reed also states that
in matters of one's own purely private
conduct . . . it would seem that he might
act according to his own opinion, unless
it is clear that the authority teaching intended not only to teach a point of natural law, but also, insofar as necessary,
to impose a norm of conduct in virtue of
its juridictional authority. . . .But it must
be emphasized that the exception contemplated here is a rather extraordinary thing,
more likely to be verified when questions
of fact enter in than in matters of principle .... It will not easily nor commonly
happen that the ordinary faithful, the ordinary priest, or even the ordinary theologian will be in a position prudently to
depart from the sort of authentic teaching
at issue here.
This explanation by Reed represents
the traditional interpretation of "religious
submission of mind and will." Since Vatican II, however, some theologians stress
more positively the Catholic's freedom of
thought and inquiry both in the internal
and external orders. They base this more
extensive freedom on its intrinsic merits
and on such conciliar statements as the
following: "Let it be recognized that all
the faithful, clerical and lay, possess a lawful freedom of inquiry and thought, and
the freedom to express their mind humbly
and courageously about those matters in
In
which they enjoy competence.""
addition, they cite various passages of the
Council's documents on the right of religious freedom and the general obligation
to seek religious truth as tending to support the logic of their position.
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This broader interpretation has become
widely operative today. Particularly in the
enormous literature on contraception and
the pill, many Catholic authors call openly
for a revision of past authentic papal
teachings. Whatever be the actual merit
of these authors' opinions, they imply a
different practical interpretation of "religious submission of mind and will" than
Reed's. When applied to the Church's
statements on natural law, this broad interpretation would allow an almost unlimited freedom of thought, inquiry, and
explicit expression of disagreement.
Working within the context of the more
stringent interpretation, moreover, far more
freedom of thought and inquiry emerges
than at first glance. Must a Catholic show
"religious submission of mind and will"
to all the Church statements on natural
law? Theologians answer this question
negatively, for not all ecclesiastical pronouncements possess the same obligatory
force. Some authentic teachings are purposeful and create an obligation of acceptance. Other statements made without professedly intending to teach the
doctrine as Catholic are not obligatory.
Vatican II provides several helpful
criteria for discerning this difference: "His
[the pope's] mind and will in the matter
may be known chiefly either from the
character of the documents, from his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or
from his manner of speaking." 45 John
(Continued on page 91)
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Ford and Gerald Kelly, writing at an
earlier date, proposed three criteria: the
verbal formulas used in the pronouncements, the intention of the speaker, and
46
the historical context of the document.
Utilizing these various criteria, which overlap to some extent, one can readily conclude that many teachings of the Church
based on natural law possess strong binding force. Pope Pius XII's condemnations
of therapeutic abortion, euthanasia, and
artificial insemination, and Vatican II's
condemnation of indiscriminate acts of
war directed against entire cities or extensive areas together with their civilian
47
populations fall into this category.

As a general rule, greater stress falls
on such specific moral conclusions based on
natural law than on the systematic explanation of the principles from which they
are derived. Certain theoretical teachings,
it is true, receive repeated emphasis; for
example, those on the objectivity, substantial immutability, universality, and
basic knowability of natural law. The
core content of these teachings, as I have
said, constitutes an article of faith. Besides these rather basic assertions, another body of statements on specific moral
conclusions demands "religious submission
of mind and will." In my opinion, most
statements about the derivation of specific
natural law obligations and about the philosophical explanation of natural law are
non-obligatory, for they do not professedly
intend to teach the doctrine as Catholic.

46 FORD-KELLY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 28-32.
47 See Address to the Italian Catholic Union of
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